

氏 名 Anton Luis Capistrano SEVILLA

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学位論文題目 Exporting the Ethics of Emptiness: Applications, Limitations,  
and Possibilities of Watsuji Tetsurō's Ethical System

論文審査委員 主 査 教授 伊東 貴之  
教授 末木 文美士  
教授 稲賀 繁美  
教授 嘉指 信雄 神戸大学大学院  
James Mark Shields Bucknell University  
Associate Professor

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論文内容の要旨  
Summary of thesis contents

This dissertation examines Watsuji's systematic ethics, its reception, its contemporary/global applications, and the limitations and possibilities of such applications. Watsuji's systematic ethics is primarily comprised of the three volumes of *Ethics* (1937, 1942/46, 1949), but includes other auxiliary works written in the 1930s and 1940s. This dissertation analyzes how these works have been received outside Japan and in various fields. Key figures here include Erin McCarthy (care ethics and philosophy of human relations), John Maraldo (political philosophy), Christopher Jones (global ethics), and William LaFleur (Buddhist philosophy). However, these thinkers tend to focus on a narrow segment of Watsuji's thought, and fail to consider his systematic ethics as a whole. Therefore, this dissertation carefully scrutinizes the foundations of these readings in the original Japanese texts and tries to take these global applications to their utmost potential. It also considers the critiques of Watsuji from both Japan and abroad in order to see the limitations and problems in Watsuji's theories that confound their applicability. Finally, in light of both Watsuji's applications and limitations, this dissertation seeks a unifying thread that binds the contributions of Watsuji, and thus finds a way to critically read (or re-read) Watsuji in a way that provides a synthetic insight that productively responds to the philosophical questions and pragmatic concerns shared across the globe today.

The applications and critiques of Watsuji point to four theoretical dilemmas: singularity vs. relationality, liberalism vs. communitarianism, moral universalism vs. relativism, and transcendence vs. immanence. By examining Watsuji's texts in response to these four paradoxes, this dissertation highlights the full range of Watsuji's ethical insights.

This dissertation is developed across six inner chapters in addition to the introduction and conclusion. These can be summarized as follows:

The introduction threshes out the problem, methodology, and scope of this dissertation. It also narrates the life and works of Watsuji, in order to paint a more vivid picture of the person behind this philosophy. Furthermore, it details the history of Watsuji's reception outside Japan, and also analyzes the history of Watsuji studies in Japan and the varied approaches to his thought.

Chapter I, "The Systematic Unity of Ethics," is a broad analysis of the continuity in the development of Watsuji Tetsur?'s ethical project. It studies his key systematic works, beginning with two preparatory books, *Milieu: Anthropological Considerations* (1935) and *Ethics as the Study of Ningen* (1934), and proceeding to

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a synthetic view of the three volumes of Ethics. Having thus broadly examined the development of ideas across the key works of this period of Watsuji's career, this chapter highlights four main contributions of Watsuji's systematic ethics: understanding human existence through dualities, retrieving the ethical relevance of communal life, clarifying the nature of relationships, and understanding the situatedness of ethics in finite, concrete totalities.

Chapter II, "Relationality and Singularity," discusses a key problem that emerges at the very core of Watsuji's ideas: what are the fundamental limits of relationality, and to what extent are we able to share in each other's lives given our differences? The chapter begins with a close examination of Watsuji's idea of relationality and the many facets of human interrelatedness. It then proceeds to Erin McCarthy's positive appraisal of Watsuji's relational core in relation to care ethics and feminist ethics, where we see Watsuji's possible contribution through his theory of radical human relationality and the interpersonal nature of ethics. But against this positive reading, this chapter discusses Watsuji's uneasy relationship with the postmodern/poststructural idea of alterity, and the excessive tendencies of his notion of relation that prevent a naive integration of his thought with the ethics of care. After drawing these problems out through some hints from poststructural philosophy (particularly Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-Luc Nancy), it returns to Watsuji and explores the areas where Watsuji tries to maintain a sense of the singularity of the individual despite the fundamental nature of relationality. Here we see that when Watsuji emphasizes the dynamic, anti-substantializing character of emptiness, he can contribute to poststructuralist theories of community.

Chapter III, "The Balancing Act between Individuality and Totality," discusses the disruptions in the systematic unity of the three volumes of Ethics, particularly surrounding the dual-structure of individuality and communality as seen in the relationship of the citizen and the state. It examines how Watsuji's interpretation of the dual-structure shifts over the pre-war, wartime, and post-war volumes. This chapter argues that in the first volume, double-negation is ambiguously explained as either an endless cycle that balances individuality and totality or a three-stage dialectic that privileges totality. There is also a very limited view of social change. In the second volume, the individual is largely subsumed beneath finite and exclusive totalities, and social change is restricted to advances in culture. But, in the third volume, individuality is reinstated as that which guides social change by intuiting how the totality ought to be. Also, double-negation is reinterpreted as heading toward unity-in-difference. Having thus examined the shifts in Watsuji's view of the dual-structure, this chapter attempts to understand these shifts in light of the historical context of World War II. Finally, this chapter considers the contemporary debate between liberalism and communitarianism, where we see the possibility of Watsuji overcoming this binary through a thoroughgoing

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critique of both liberal individualism and communitarian fixed relativism.

Chapter IV, “The Universal and the Particular in Global Ethics” takes up the dual-structure as it moves at a higher level—the relationship between individual nations and the inter-national space of history. Is global ethics a matter of universal norms that directly connect to individuals regardless of their historical-cultural specificity? Or is ethics a matter of relative and particular national morals? It begins with an examination of the particular moment of Ethics—the attempt to situate relations in the body as it moves in space and time in a concrete environment with a shared history. The discussion then proceeds to Watsuji’s view of the debate between universal morality and national morals in two earlier essays—first his critique of national morals, then his critique of universal morality. Finally, it shows how he tries to apply this in his view of international history and global ethics. This chapter ends by analyzing the contemporary debates on moral relativism and cosmopolitanism, and suggests how Watsuji might contribute to a new way of approaching these discourses with a theory of a universal ethical structure that accommodates for historically and culturally particular ethical content.

The first four chapters focus on how Watsuji’s idea of emptiness might contribute to the debates between singularity and relationality, liberalism and communitarianism, and moral universalism and relativism. Building on these, Chapter V, “The Buddhist Roots of the Ethics of Emptiness,” takes up this central idea of emptiness directly. Where does this idea come from? It examines Watsuji’s “The Concept of ‘Dharma’ and the Dialectics of Emptiness in Buddhist Philosophy” (1931) and the lecture notes eventually published as *The History of Buddhist Ethical Thought* (1963), detailing Watsuji’s view on dharma, dependent arising, and the idea of emptiness in Theravada and Mahāyāna Buddhism. It then shows how this Buddhist theory connects to Watsuji’s systematic ethical project. It argues that these two projects are continuous in focusing on non-duality, negation, and emptiness, and details how Watsuji’s appropriation of Buddhism is lensed through Hegel. It also examines three points in which these two projects are discontinuous: first, in his confusion about how to apply emptiness to individuality and totality; second, in the shift in his understanding of the non-duality of “is” and “ought;” and finally, in the clash between hermeneutics and transcendence.

Chapter VI, “Transcendence and Everydayness in Buddhist-Hermeneutic Ethics,” takes up the gap between Watsuji’s Buddhist ethics and his hermeneutic ethics and explores the academic and political significance of being aware of this gap. Beyond that, it also examines the possibility of bridging this gap, first by highlighting parts of his systematic ethics that allow for a sense of critique, and second by unmasking certain ideals within his purportedly neutral hermeneutics that allow for a more critically transcendent view of emptiness as an ideal. A key element here is

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Watsuji's view of culture as "spiritual community" as exemplified in his view of linked-verse poetry. Having drawn out these possible syntheses, this chapter sketches a possible "Buddhist-hermeneutic model" of ethics which combines the strengths of the two approaches. It ends by examining the contemporary discourses on Japanese Buddhism and social ethics, particularly those by Christopher Ives and James Mark Shields, and argues that Watsuji can contribute to the key question of transcendence and everydayness in Buddhist social ethics through a theory of awakening, not as "universal awakening," but as an awakening to finite totalities. Such a theory allows for an immediate unity between spiritual liberation and structural emancipation in socio-political life.

The general conclusion brings together the key points of this dissertation with a summary of what Watsuji was trying to accomplish in his systematic ethics; his contributions to contemporary discourses in global society, as well as the potential for future applications in this area; and the legitimate limitations of Watsuji's approach. Finally, it demonstrates how all of the attempts to contribute to the various contemporary discourses are conducted through a single consistent approach to Watsuji's systematic ethics, which highlights the idea of emptiness as destabilization and tensional unity of subject/object and individuality/totality. This approach to emptiness is able to address all of the above issues in a systematic way, while offering ways to overcome existing limitations in Watsuji's thought.

博士論文の審査結果の要旨  
Summary of the results of the doctoral thesis screening

本出願論文 Exporting the Ethics of Emptiness: Applications, Limitations, and Possibilities of Watsuji Tetsur?'s Ethical System (「空の倫理学を世界の場へ——和辻哲郎の体系的倫理学の応用・限界・可能性」) は、全六章と序論・結論からなり、和辻哲郎の主著『倫理学』を主要な素材としつつ、彼の倫理学の体系の全般に亘って、詳細な分析や検討を加えると同時に、現代のグローバルな倫理学上の諸問題に対して、如何なる適用や応用、貢献が可能であるのか、広い世界的な視座から、その可能性や限界について、考察を行うもので、大変刺激的で、きわめて意欲的な論攷である。

まず、第一章 The Systematic Unity of Ethics (『倫理学』の体系的統一性) では、和辻の『倫理学』を『風土』『人間の学としての倫理学』などの周辺の著作と併せて、かなり詳細に検討し、紹介する。これは、現状で『倫理学』が第一巻しか英訳されておらず、第二・三巻が、欧米ではなお十分には知られていない状況からも、必須のものである。具体的には、彼の倫理学の基調をなす、否定的二重構造や絶対的な否定性としての空、人倫的な世界(間柄の性質や共同体の倫理的意義)、有限的・具体的な全体における倫理の属性(空間と風土性、国民国家と歴史性)などの諸概念が再検証される。本章では、第二章以下の議論が予知されると同時に、本論文が観念的・抽象的な議論ではなく、歴史的・文献的な研究としても、確かな基礎を有するものであることが認められる。

次いで、第二章 Relationality and Singularity (「間柄性と特異性」) では、和辻の理論の根幹をなす「間柄」や「間人性」を中心に、それに回収されない特異性・単独性の問題が俎上に載せられ、最近の欧米の議論をも参照しながら、他者性の問題や和辻における単独性の契機の重要性などが示唆される。具体的には、マッカーシーのケア倫理やフェミニズム論、エマニュエル・レヴィナスやジャン＝リュック・ナンシーらのポスト構造主義の議論などを手掛かりとして、和辻の理論が、ポスト構造主義的な共同体論にも、一定程度、貢献し得るとする。

第三章 The Balancing Act between Individuality and Totality (「個人性と全体性のバランス」) では、市民と国家など、個人性と全体性の矛盾やディレンマ、両義性を孕んだ二重構造に関して、和辻が両者のバランスを如何に調停しようとしたのか、とりわけ戦前・戦中・戦後へと亘って、時代の転変を反映した彼の思想の歴史的な変遷を具体的に追跡していることが特筆される。そして、二重否定的な「差異における統一」を目指す和辻の理論が、今日のリベラル対コミュニタリアンの論争とも結び付く問題であったことを論証しつつ、そうした二項対立を超克する可能性を示唆する。

第四章 The Universal and the Particular in Global Ethics (「グローバル倫理学における普遍性と特殊性」) では、歴史倫理学における普遍性と特殊性に関して、和辻が、国民国家や国民道徳的な特殊性と、より世界的な場における普遍的な道徳との統一を如何なるかたちで模索したのか、道徳的な相対主義や普遍主義・世界主義をめぐる現代の論争とも絡めて再検討しつつ、そうした議論に対して、和辻倫理学が、如何なる現代的な貢献をなし得るかについて、独自の考察を展開する。

第五章 The Buddhist Roots of the Ethics of Emptiness (「空の倫理学の仏教的根源」) では、上述したような二項対立的な問題に対する、和辻の解答の根柢には、仏教の「空」の概念にもとづく仏教的な倫理学があるとの前提のもとに、『仏教倫理思想史』を中心に、

彼の原始仏教や大乘仏教、縁起説や「空」概念への理解を追尋しつつ、それが和辻の体系的倫理学に如何に繋がるのかを跡づける。具体的には、初期の現象学的な解釈学的倫理学から、ヘーゲルの「人倫」の思想を踏まえた仏教的な倫理学への移行の軌跡を辿りながら、両者の齟齬や矛盾、両者の調和の破綻などにも批判的に言及する。

さらに、第六章 Transcendence and Everydayness in Buddhist-Hermeneutic Ethics (「仏教的・解釈学的倫理学における超越性と日常性」) や結論では、上述した和辻の仏教的な倫理学と解釈学的倫理学との差異を自覚化することを通じて、新たに「仏教解釈学的モデル」の構築や提示を試みながら、「空」の概念や二重の否定性などを再評価することで、クリストファー・アイブスやジェームズ＝マーク・シールズらの日本仏教と社会倫理をめぐる論争なども参照しつつ、今日の倫理学への適用の可能性を眺望する。また、本章で触れられた、連歌に見られる共同性に対する着目は卓見であり、さらなる展開の余地を秘めている。

以上のように、本論文は全体として、和辻の倫理学体系への具体的で深い洞察とともに、世界的・現代的な諸課題を見据えた問題意識や鋭い示唆に富み、和辻の理論を現代哲学・倫理学の場に引き出す営為として、新鮮で大きな一石を投じるものである。

その際、一方で、大著『倫理学』を中心とする和辻の関連著作を深く読み込むとともに、他方で、欧米、特に英語圏を中心とした和辻への再評価の潮流に棹さしながら、特異性と関係性、リベラリズムとコミュニタリアニズム、道徳的普遍主義と価値相対主義、超越性と内在性などの対立や矛盾に対して、和辻倫理学が有為な応答を成し得る可能性を見出そうとする点において、きわめて独創的である。表題からも窺えるように、現代的な論争にも一石を投じようとする姿勢において一貫しており、そのため、敢えて英語で記述されている。具体的には、マッカーシー(ケア倫理学)、マラルド(政治哲学)、ジョーンズ(グローバル倫理)、ラフルール(仏教学)などの研究をも参照しつつ、進められるが、必要に応じて、彼らの解釈への批判や補完も行いながら、和辻の理論の適用可能性や制約について、批判的な分析と考察を加えている。この点で、単に国内の学会だけでなく、国際的にも大きな問題提起をなしている。

但し、本論文の瑕瑾としては、総じて、和辻の倫理学を現代哲学や倫理学の問題設定と結び付けようとする過程で、二項対立的な問題点の指摘やその超越・止揚の方途に関して、やや図式的な議論に傾いた部分も見受けられた。また、今後の課題としては、歴史的な見地から、和辻を相対化するためにも、西田幾多郎や田辺元の「種の論理」、西谷啓治らの所説との異同など、同時代の日本の哲学者の言説や思想状況に対しても、より一層、考察を深めることが望まれる。

以上の諸点を総合的に検討した結果、本論文は、現代的かつ国際的な視座から、和辻哲郎の倫理学の体系を再検証するとともに、すぐれて同時代的な議論にも大いに貢献する内容であると認められた。同時に上記の問題点に関しても、今後の研究の進展によって、克服されるものと判断された。

その結果、本論文を博士の学位を授与するに値するものとして、審査委員会の全員一致で判定した。