@article{oai:ir.soken.ac.jp:00003659,
 author = {大槻, 久 and OHTSUKI, Hisashi and BORDALO, Pedro and NOWAK, Martin A},
 issue = {2},
 journal = {Journal of Theoretical Biology, Journal of Theoretical Biology},
 month = {Nov},
 note = {application/pdf, Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations provide a new framework for studying selection of traits with frequency-dependent fitness. Recently, a “one-third law” of evolutionary dynamics has been described, which states that strategy A fixates in a B-population with selective advantage if the fitness of A is greater than that of B when A has frequency 1/3. This relationship holds for all evolutionary processes examined so far, from the Moran process to games on graphs. However, the origin of the “number” 1/3 is not understood. In this paper we provide an intuitive explanation by studying the underlying stochastic processes. We find that in one invasion attempt, an individual interacts on average with B-players twice as often as with A-players, which yields the one-third law. We also show that the one-third law implies that the average Malthusian fitness of A is positive.},
 pages = {289--295},
 title = {The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics},
 volume = {249},
 year = {2007}
}