{"created":"2023-06-20T13:20:48.375710+00:00","id":860,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"39c14a40-4495-4cb4-b036-a995fb453e06"},"_deposit":{"created_by":1,"id":"860","owners":[1],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"860"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:ir.soken.ac.jp:00000860","sets":["2:429:19"]},"author_link":["0","0","0"],"item_1_creator_2":{"attribute_name":"著者名","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"李, 明媚"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"0","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_1_creator_3":{"attribute_name":"フリガナ","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"リ, ミングメイ"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"0","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_1_date_granted_11":{"attribute_name":"学位授与年月日","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_dategranted":"2007-03-23"}]},"item_1_degree_grantor_5":{"attribute_name":"学位授与機関","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_degreegrantor":[{"subitem_degreegrantor_name":"総合研究大学院大学"}]}]},"item_1_degree_name_6":{"attribute_name":"学位名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_degreename":"博士（情報学）"}]},"item_1_description_12":{"attribute_name":"要旨","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"  In wireless ad hoc networks, all nodes cooperate to provide network services. <br />Due to the limited radio transmission range, data packets are usually forwarded <br />through multiple relay nodes before they reach the destinations. If a node always <br />serves as a relay to transmit the packets, it may quickly use up its own energy and <br />other resources. Therefore, some nodes use a selfish approach: they try to avoid <br />forwarding the packets. Such selfish behavior would probably cause the network to <br />break down. Selfish nodes are common within ad hoc networks because they are <br />managed by different authorities. <br />   In this thesis, the node cooperation problems are analyzed in two steps: 1) <br />a game theoretic analysis is provided to stimulate node to cooperate; 2) a price- <br />demand function based incentive model is proposed to optimize the nodes' service <br />demand and service provision, and encourage the relay nodes to be honest. <br />   Firstly, a game theoretic analysis is proposed to study node cooperation. In the <br />related chapter, a \"payment and compensation\" scheme is used as a less-aggressive <br />way to avoid nodes' non-cooperative behavior. It is assumed that once a packet is <br />sent from a source node, the packet is associated with a sending fee, i.e, when a node <br />needs sending the packets as a source node, a sending fee is required (e.g. reasonably <br />some money). The fee is adjustable according to the network status, whereas the <br />node can also accept or reject the fee. In order to induce voluntary forwarding, the <br />network will also compensate the nodes who consume their energy in forwarding the <br />packets for others. If I think the sending fee as the penalties to the source nodes and <br />the compensation fee as the encouragement to relay nodes, then local optimization <br />of the node, (the desired performance plus the compensat,ion then minus the cost <br />to be paid) will yield an optimal point. Each node can only select its own packet <br />generation strategy, however the final utility of each node is determined by the <br />strategy set constituted by the other nodes. With the game theoretic analysis, I <br />found that by introducing an incentive pricing policy \"payment and compensation\"<br />the relay nodes have less motivation to drop the packets. However, I also found <br />that game theoretic literature may not be directly applicable in the scenario where <br />cheating nodes exist and how to reasonably charge the source nodes and compensates <br />the relay nodes.<br />     Therefore, secondly, a price-demand function based incentive model (PDM) is <br />proposed. In the PDM model, the network is modeled as a market, where the pricing<br />is determined by the source node's demahd and the relay node's service supply. The<br />source nodes make use of a price-demand function, which allocates payments to <br />the service provider (relay nodes). The relay nodes are encouraged to cooperate <br />in the PDM model, which is based on the assumption that each relay node wishes <br />to maximize its payoff. Then the source nodes can optimize their prices and the <br />number of sending packets to satisfy the relay nodes' payoff requirement. Once <br />the payoff requirements of the relay nodes are satisfied, the relay nodes have no <br />reason to be selfish. In the PDM model, a source node that has packets to send <br />initially broadcasts RREQ in the network. Once the relay node(s) are selected, each <br />relay node replies to the source node for its forwarding cost. Then the source node <br />calculates the price of the sendihg packets it will pay for each relay node and the <br />number of packets it will send. According to the source nodes' demand, it chooses <br />the route with the lowest payment or the route with the la'rgest number of sending <br />packets. The PDM pricing model seeks to address two main issues: 1) to determine <br />how much to charge the source nodes and how much to compensate the relay nodes; <br />2)to avoid the relay nodes to dishonestly report their forwarding costs. Hence, the <br />contributions are summarized as follows: 1) The relay nodes intend to dishonestly <br />report their forwarding cost to gain a high payoff from the source nodes, which <br />obviously contradicts with the motivation to stimulate cooperation. In the PDM <br />model, however, the relay nodes will have no reason to report a false forwarding cost, <br />since only telling the truth guarantees the relay nodes' final payoff. Such a property <br />is shown by the proof. 2) The PDM pricing model reflects the relationship between <br />the service demand of the source nodes and the service supply of the relay nodes. <br />The PDM model can save money for the source nodes for sending the packets, which <br />is indicated by the simulation results. <br />","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_1_description_18":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_1_description_7":{"attribute_name":"学位記番号","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"総研大甲第1050号","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_1_select_14":{"attribute_name":"所蔵","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_select_item":"有"}]},"item_1_select_8":{"attribute_name":"研究科","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_select_item":"複合科学研究科"}]},"item_1_select_9":{"attribute_name":"専攻","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_select_item":"17 情報学専攻"}]},"item_1_text_10":{"attribute_name":"学位授与年度","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"2006"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"LI, Mingmei","creatorNameLang":"en"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"0","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_files":{"attribute_name":"ファイル情報","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"accessrole":"open_date","date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2016-02-17"}],"displaytype":"simple","filename":"甲1050_要旨.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"288.6 kB"}],"format":"application/pdf","licensetype":"license_11","mimetype":"application/pdf","url":{"label":"要旨・審査要旨","url":"https://ir.soken.ac.jp/record/860/files/甲1050_要旨.pdf"},"version_id":"a8b7978f-36fc-441b-a180-64af3980fad1"},{"accessrole":"open_date","date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2016-02-17"}],"displaytype":"simple","filename":"甲1050_本文.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"14.0 MB"}],"format":"application/pdf","licensetype":"license_11","mimetype":"application/pdf","url":{"label":"本文","url":"https://ir.soken.ac.jp/record/860/files/甲1050_本文.pdf"},"version_id":"dc87b342-0ae4-4c78-81d3-cad6b308ed95"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"thesis","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_46ec"}]},"item_title":"Strategic Pricing to Stimulate Node Cooperation in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Strategic Pricing to Stimulate Node Cooperation in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks"},{"subitem_title":"Strategic Pricing to Stimulate Node Cooperation in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks","subitem_title_language":"en"}]},"item_type_id":"1","owner":"1","path":["19"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2010-02-22"},"publish_date":"2010-02-22","publish_status":"0","recid":"860","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Strategic Pricing to Stimulate Node Cooperation in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks"],"weko_creator_id":"1","weko_shared_id":-1},"updated":"2023-06-20T16:10:38.644137+00:00"}