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Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of bimatrix games
https://ir.soken.ac.jp/records/3656
https://ir.soken.ac.jp/records/3656fed116e5-7cd5-4b67-b86d-7098ae6e3474
Item type | 学術雑誌論文 / Journal Article(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2013-06-27 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of bimatrix games | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of bimatrix games | |||||
言語 | en | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
資源タイプ | journal article | |||||
アクセス権 | ||||||
アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
著者 |
OHTSUKI, Hisashi
× OHTSUKI, Hisashi |
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著者別名 |
大槻, 久
× 大槻, 久 |
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抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | Evolutionary game dynamics of two-player asymmetric games in finite populations is studied. We consider two roles in the game, roles αα and ββ. α-playersα-players and β-playersβ-players interact and gain payoffs. The game is described by a pair of matrices, which is called bimatrix. One's payoff in the game is interpreted as its fecundity, thus strategies are subject to natural selection. In addition, strategies can randomly mutate to others. We formulate a stochastic evolutionary game dynamics of bimatrix games as a frequency-dependent Moran process with mutation. We analytically derive the stationary distribution of strategies under weak selection. Our result provides a criterion for equilibrium selection in general bimatrix games. | |||||
書誌情報 |
Journal of Theoretical Biology en : Journal of Theoretical Biology 巻 264, 号 1, p. 136-142, 発行日 2010-05 |
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出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | Elsevier | |||||
ISSN | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||
収録物識別子 | 00225193 | |||||
PubMed番号 | ||||||
識別子タイプ | PMID | |||||
関連識別子 | 20096289 | |||||
DOI | ||||||
識別子タイプ | DOI | |||||
関連識別子 | http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.01.016 | |||||
関連名称 | 10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.01.016 | |||||
権利 | ||||||
権利情報 | © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. |