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  1. 010 学術雑誌論文
  2. 大槻, 久 / OHTSUKI, Hisashi

Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation

https://ir.soken.ac.jp/records/3662
https://ir.soken.ac.jp/records/3662
d84c6287-17d0-4300-88b1-26176e29fd87
Item type 学術雑誌論文 / Journal Article(1)
公開日 2013-06-27
タイトル
タイトル Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation
タイトル
タイトル Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation
言語 en
言語
言語 eng
資源タイプ
資源タイプ識別子 http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
資源タイプ journal article
アクセス権
アクセス権 metadata only access
アクセス権URI http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb
著者 OHTSUKI, Hisashi

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OHTSUKI, Hisashi

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IWASA, Yoh

× IWASA, Yoh

IWASA, Yoh

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著者別名 大槻, 久

× 大槻, 久

大槻, 久

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抄録
内容記述タイプ Abstract
内容記述 Reputation formation is a key to understanding indirect reciprocity. In particular, the way to assign reputation to each individual, namely a norm that describes who is good and who is bad, greatly affects the possibility of sustained cooperation in the population. Previously, we have exhaustively studied reputation dynamics that are able to maintain a high level of cooperation at the ESS. However, this analysis examined the stability of monomorphic population and did not investigate polymorphic population where several strategies coexist. Here, we study the evolutionary dynamics of multiple behavioral strategies by replicator dynamics. We exhaustively study all 16 possible norms under which the reputation of a player in the next round is determined by the action of the self and the reputation of the opponent. For each norm, we explore evolutionary dynamics of three strategies: unconditional cooperators, unconditional defectors, and conditional cooperators. We find that only three norms, simple-standing, Kandori, and shunning, can make conditional cooperation evolutionarily stable, hence, realize sustained cooperation. The other 13 norms, including scoring, ultimately lead to the invasion by defectors. Also, we study the model in which private reputation errors exist to a small extent. In this case, we find the stable coexistence of unconditional and conditional cooperators under the three norms.
書誌情報 Journal of Theoretical Biology
en : Journal of Theoretical Biology

巻 244, 号 3, p. 518-531, 発行日 2007-02-07
出版者
出版者 Elsevier
ISSN
収録物識別子タイプ ISSN
収録物識別子 00225193
DOI
識別子タイプ DOI
関連識別子 http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.08.018
関連名称 10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.08.018
権利
権利情報 © 2006 Elsevier Ltd.
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