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Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation
https://ir.soken.ac.jp/records/3662
https://ir.soken.ac.jp/records/3662d84c6287-17d0-4300-88b1-26176e29fd87
| Item type | 学術雑誌論文 / Journal Article(1) | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2013-06-27 | |||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||
| タイトル | Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation | |||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||
| タイトル | Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation | |||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||||||
| 資源タイプ | journal article | |||||||||
| アクセス権 | ||||||||||
| アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||||||
| アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||||||
| 著者 |
OHTSUKI, Hisashi
× OHTSUKI, Hisashi
× IWASA, Yoh
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| 著者別名 |
大槻, 久
× 大槻, 久
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| 抄録 | ||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | Reputation formation is a key to understanding indirect reciprocity. In particular, the way to assign reputation to each individual, namely a norm that describes who is good and who is bad, greatly affects the possibility of sustained cooperation in the population. Previously, we have exhaustively studied reputation dynamics that are able to maintain a high level of cooperation at the ESS. However, this analysis examined the stability of monomorphic population and did not investigate polymorphic population where several strategies coexist. Here, we study the evolutionary dynamics of multiple behavioral strategies by replicator dynamics. We exhaustively study all 16 possible norms under which the reputation of a player in the next round is determined by the action of the self and the reputation of the opponent. For each norm, we explore evolutionary dynamics of three strategies: unconditional cooperators, unconditional defectors, and conditional cooperators. We find that only three norms, simple-standing, Kandori, and shunning, can make conditional cooperation evolutionarily stable, hence, realize sustained cooperation. The other 13 norms, including scoring, ultimately lead to the invasion by defectors. Also, we study the model in which private reputation errors exist to a small extent. In this case, we find the stable coexistence of unconditional and conditional cooperators under the three norms. | |||||||||
| 書誌情報 |
Journal of Theoretical Biology en : Journal of Theoretical Biology 巻 244, 号 3, p. 518-531, 発行日 2007-02-07 |
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| 出版者 | ||||||||||
| 出版者 | Elsevier | |||||||||
| ISSN | ||||||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||||||
| 収録物識別子 | 00225193 | |||||||||
| DOI | ||||||||||
| 識別子タイプ | DOI | |||||||||
| 関連識別子 | http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.08.018 | |||||||||
| 関連名称 | 10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.08.018 | |||||||||
| 権利 | ||||||||||
| 権利情報 | © 2006 Elsevier Ltd. | |||||||||
