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  1. 010 学術雑誌論文
  2. 大槻, 久 / OHTSUKI, Hisashi

The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity

https://ir.soken.ac.jp/records/3664
https://ir.soken.ac.jp/records/3664
22ee5972-04c9-4e18-ace5-04381d9e7eb5
Item type 学術雑誌論文 / Journal Article(1)
公開日 2013-06-27
タイトル
タイトル The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
タイトル
言語 en
タイトル The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
言語
言語 eng
資源タイプ
資源タイプ識別子 http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
資源タイプ journal article
アクセス権
アクセス権 metadata only access
アクセス権URI http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb
著者 OHTSUKI, Hisashi

× OHTSUKI, Hisashi

WEKO 770

OHTSUKI, Hisashi

Search repository
IWASA, Yoh

× IWASA, Yoh

WEKO 1547

IWASA, Yoh

Search repository
著者別名 大槻, 久

× 大槻, 久

WEKO 773
NRID 1000050517802
e-Rad 50517802

大槻, 久

Search repository
抄録
内容記述タイプ Abstract
内容記述 The theory of indirect reciprocation explains the evolution of cooperation among unrelated individuals, engaging in one-shot interaction. Using reputation, a player acquires information on who are worth cooperating and who are not. In a previous paper, we formalized the reputation dynamics, a rule to assign a binary reputation (good or bad) to each player when his action, his current reputation, and the opponent's reputation are given. We then examined all the possible reputation dynamics, and found that there exist only eight reputation dynamics named “leading eight” that can maintain the ESS with a high level of cooperation, even if errors are included in executing intended cooperation and in reporting the observation to the public. In this paper, we study the nature of these successful social norms. First, we characterize the role of each pivot of the reputation dynamics common to all of the leading eight. We conclude that keys to the success in indirect reciprocity are to be nice (maintenance of cooperation among themselves), retaliatory (detection of defectors, punishment, and justification of punishment), apologetic, and forgiving. Second, we prove the two basic properties of the leading eight, which give a quantitative evaluation of the ESS condition and the level of cooperation maintained at the ESS.
書誌情報 Journal of Theoretical Biology
en : Journal of Theoretical Biology

巻 239, 号 4, p. 435-444, 発行日 2006-04-21
出版者
出版者 Elsevier
ISSN
収録物識別子タイプ ISSN
収録物識別子 00225193
DOI
識別子タイプ DOI
関連識別子 http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.08.008
関連名称 10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.08.008
権利
権利情報 © 2005 Elsevier Ltd.
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