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Indirect reciprocity in three types of social dilemmas.
https://ir.soken.ac.jp/records/5410
https://ir.soken.ac.jp/records/54101609d9ba-acf2-416c-b489-1025e84ae0a5
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Author's post-print 文章のみ (375.4 kB)
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Author's post-print 図表 ① (20.2 kB)
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Author's post-print 図表 ② (21.4 kB)
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Author's post-print 全文(文章と図表の統合版) (409.1 kB)
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Item type | 学術雑誌論文 / Journal Article(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2016-07-11 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Indirect reciprocity in three types of social dilemmas. | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Indirect reciprocity in three types of social dilemmas. | |||||
言語 | en | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
言語 | en | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Complicity | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
言語 | en | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Cooperative Behavior | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
言語 | en | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Humans | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
言語 | en | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Male | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
言語 | en | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Models, Theoretical | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
資源タイプ | journal article | |||||
著者 |
NAKAMURA, Mitsuhiro
× NAKAMURA, Mitsuhiro× OHTSUKI, Hisashi |
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著者注記 | ||||||
値 | Nakamura, Mitsuhiro : Department of Evolutionary Studies of Biosystems, The Graduate University for Advanced Studies (SOKENDAI) *(Research Fellow) | |||||
著者注記 | ||||||
値 | Ohtsuki, Hisashi : Department of Evolutionary Studies of Biosystems, The Graduate University for Advanced Studies (SOKENDAI) *(Lecturer) | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | Indirect reciprocity is a key mechanism for the evolution of human cooperation. Previous studies explored indirect reciprocity in the so-called donation game, a special class of Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) with unilateral decision making. A more general class of social dilemmas includes Snowdrift (SG), Stag Hunt (SH), and PD games, where two players perform actions simultaneously. In these simultaneous-move games, moral assessments need to be more complex; for example, how should we evaluate defection against an ill-reputed, but now cooperative, player? We examined indirect reciprocity in the three social dilemmas and identified twelve successful social norms for moral assessments. These successful norms have different principles in different dilemmas for suppressing cheaters. To suppress defectors, any defection against good players is prohibited in SG and PD, whereas defection against good players may be allowed in SH. To suppress unconditional cooperators, who help anyone and thereby indirectly contribute to jeopardizing indirect reciprocity, we found two mechanisms: indiscrimination between actions toward bad players (feasible in SG and PD) or punishment for cooperation with bad players (effective in any social dilemma). Moreover, we discovered that social norms that unfairly favor reciprocators enhance robustness of cooperation in SH, whereby reciprocators never lose their good reputation. | |||||
論文注記 | ||||||
値 | Available online 8 April 2014 | |||||
書誌情報 |
Journal of theoretical biology en : Journal of theoretical biology 巻 355, p. 117-127, 発行日 2014-04-08 |
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雑誌情報 | ||||||
値 | Publication Start Year : 1961 | |||||
雑誌情報 | ||||||
値 | Frequency : Semimonthly | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | Elsevier / Amsterdam | |||||
ISSN | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||
収録物識別子 | 0022-5193 | |||||
Online ISSN | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||
収録物識別子 | 1095-8541 | |||||
書誌レコードID (NCID) | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AA11543455 | |||||
PubMed番号 | ||||||
識別子タイプ | PMID | |||||
関連識別子 | 24721479 | |||||
DOI | ||||||
識別子タイプ | DOI | |||||
関連識別子 | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.03.035 | |||||
関連名称 | 10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.03.035 <ELSEVIER ScienceDirect> | |||||
権利 | ||||||
権利情報 | © 2014 Elsevier Ltd | |||||
関連サイト | ||||||
識別子タイプ | URI | |||||
関連識別子 | http://www.journals.elsevier.com/journal-of-theoretical-biology | |||||
関連名称 | Journal of Theoretical Biology <ELSEVIER> |