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If a node always \u003cbr /\u003eserves as a relay to transmit the packets, it may quickly use up its own energy and \u003cbr /\u003eother resources. Therefore, some nodes use a selfish approach: they try to avoid \u003cbr /\u003eforwarding the packets. Such selfish behavior would probably cause the network to \u003cbr /\u003ebreak down. Selfish nodes are common within ad hoc networks because they are \u003cbr /\u003emanaged by different authorities. \u003cbr /\u003e In this thesis, the node cooperation problems are analyzed in two steps: 1) \u003cbr /\u003ea game theoretic analysis is provided to stimulate node to cooperate; 2) a price- \u003cbr /\u003edemand function based incentive model is proposed to optimize the nodes\u0027 service \u003cbr /\u003edemand and service provision, and encourage the relay nodes to be honest. \u003cbr /\u003e Firstly, a game theoretic analysis is proposed to study node cooperation. In the \u003cbr /\u003erelated chapter, a \"payment and compensation\" scheme is used as a less-aggressive \u003cbr /\u003eway to avoid nodes\u0027 non-cooperative behavior. It is assumed that once a packet is \u003cbr /\u003esent from a source node, the packet is associated with a sending fee, i.e, when a node \u003cbr /\u003eneeds sending the packets as a source node, a sending fee is required (e.g. reasonably \u003cbr /\u003esome money). The fee is adjustable according to the network status, whereas the \u003cbr /\u003enode can also accept or reject the fee. In order to induce voluntary forwarding, the \u003cbr /\u003enetwork will also compensate the nodes who consume their energy in forwarding the \u003cbr /\u003epackets for others. If I think the sending fee as the penalties to the source nodes and \u003cbr /\u003ethe compensation fee as the encouragement to relay nodes, then local optimization \u003cbr /\u003eof the node, (the desired performance plus the compensat,ion then minus the cost \u003cbr /\u003eto be paid) will yield an optimal point. Each node can only select its own packet \u003cbr /\u003egeneration strategy, however the final utility of each node is determined by the \u003cbr /\u003estrategy set constituted by the other nodes. With the game theoretic analysis, I \u003cbr /\u003efound that by introducing an incentive pricing policy \"payment and compensation\"\u003cbr /\u003ethe relay nodes have less motivation to drop the packets. However, I also found \u003cbr /\u003ethat game theoretic literature may not be directly applicable in the scenario where \u003cbr /\u003echeating nodes exist and how to reasonably charge the source nodes and compensates \u003cbr /\u003ethe relay nodes.\u003cbr /\u003e Therefore, secondly, a price-demand function based incentive model (PDM) is \u003cbr /\u003eproposed. In the PDM model, the network is modeled as a market, where the pricing\u003cbr /\u003eis determined by the source node\u0027s demahd and the relay node\u0027s service supply. The\u003cbr /\u003esource nodes make use of a price-demand function, which allocates payments to \u003cbr /\u003ethe service provider (relay nodes). The relay nodes are encouraged to cooperate \u003cbr /\u003ein the PDM model, which is based on the assumption that each relay node wishes \u003cbr /\u003eto maximize its payoff. Then the source nodes can optimize their prices and the \u003cbr /\u003enumber of sending packets to satisfy the relay nodes\u0027 payoff requirement. Once \u003cbr /\u003ethe payoff requirements of the relay nodes are satisfied, the relay nodes have no \u003cbr /\u003ereason to be selfish. In the PDM model, a source node that has packets to send \u003cbr /\u003einitially broadcasts RREQ in the network. Once the relay node(s) are selected, each \u003cbr /\u003erelay node replies to the source node for its forwarding cost. Then the source node \u003cbr /\u003ecalculates the price of the sendihg packets it will pay for each relay node and the \u003cbr /\u003enumber of packets it will send. According to the source nodes\u0027 demand, it chooses \u003cbr /\u003ethe route with the lowest payment or the route with the la\u0027rgest number of sending \u003cbr /\u003epackets. The PDM pricing model seeks to address two main issues: 1) to determine \u003cbr /\u003ehow much to charge the source nodes and how much to compensate the relay nodes; \u003cbr /\u003e2)to avoid the relay nodes to dishonestly report their forwarding costs. Hence, the \u003cbr /\u003econtributions are summarized as follows: 1) The relay nodes intend to dishonestly \u003cbr /\u003ereport their forwarding cost to gain a high payoff from the source nodes, which \u003cbr /\u003eobviously contradicts with the motivation to stimulate cooperation. In the PDM \u003cbr /\u003emodel, however, the relay nodes will have no reason to report a false forwarding cost, \u003cbr /\u003esince only telling the truth guarantees the relay nodes\u0027 final payoff. Such a property \u003cbr /\u003eis shown by the proof. 2) The PDM pricing model reflects the relationship between \u003cbr /\u003ethe service demand of the source nodes and the service supply of the relay nodes. \u003cbr /\u003eThe PDM model can save money for the source nodes for sending the packets, which \u003cbr /\u003eis indicated by the simulation results. \u003cbr /\u003e", "subitem_description_type": "Other"}]}, "item_1_description_18": {"attribute_name": "フォーマット", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_description": "application/pdf", "subitem_description_type": "Other"}]}, "item_1_description_7": {"attribute_name": "学位記番号", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_description": "総研大甲第1050号", "subitem_description_type": "Other"}]}, "item_1_select_14": {"attribute_name": "所蔵", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_select_item": "有"}]}, "item_1_select_8": {"attribute_name": "研究科", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_select_item": "複合科学研究科"}]}, "item_1_select_9": {"attribute_name": "専攻", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_select_item": "17 情報学専攻"}]}, "item_1_text_10": {"attribute_name": "学位授与年度", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_text_value": "2006"}]}, "item_creator": {"attribute_name": "著者", "attribute_type": "creator", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"creatorNames": [{"creatorName": "LI, Mingmei", "creatorNameLang": "en"}], "nameIdentifiers": [{"nameIdentifier": "0", "nameIdentifierScheme": "WEKO"}]}]}, "item_files": {"attribute_name": "ファイル情報", "attribute_type": "file", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"accessrole": "open_date", "date": [{"dateType": "Available", "dateValue": "2016-02-17"}], "displaytype": "simple", "download_preview_message": "", "file_order": 0, "filename": "甲1050_要旨.pdf", "filesize": [{"value": "288.6 kB"}], "format": "application/pdf", "future_date_message": "", "is_thumbnail": false, "licensetype": "license_11", "mimetype": "application/pdf", "size": 288600.0, "url": {"label": "要旨・審査要旨", "url": "https://ir.soken.ac.jp/record/860/files/甲1050_要旨.pdf"}, "version_id": "a8b7978f-36fc-441b-a180-64af3980fad1"}, {"accessrole": "open_date", "date": [{"dateType": "Available", "dateValue": "2016-02-17"}], "displaytype": "simple", "download_preview_message": "", "file_order": 1, "filename": "甲1050_本文.pdf", "filesize": [{"value": "14.0 MB"}], "format": "application/pdf", "future_date_message": "", "is_thumbnail": false, "licensetype": "license_11", "mimetype": "application/pdf", "size": 14000000.0, "url": {"label": "本文", "url": "https://ir.soken.ac.jp/record/860/files/甲1050_本文.pdf"}, "version_id": "dc87b342-0ae4-4c78-81d3-cad6b308ed95"}]}, "item_language": {"attribute_name": "言語", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_language": "eng"}]}, "item_resource_type": {"attribute_name": "資源タイプ", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"resourcetype": "thesis", "resourceuri": "http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_46ec"}]}, "item_title": "Strategic Pricing to Stimulate Node Cooperation in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks", "item_titles": {"attribute_name": "タイトル", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_title": "Strategic Pricing to Stimulate Node Cooperation in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks"}, {"subitem_title": "Strategic Pricing to Stimulate Node Cooperation in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks", "subitem_title_language": "en"}]}, "item_type_id": "1", "owner": "1", "path": ["19"], "permalink_uri": "https://ir.soken.ac.jp/records/860", "pubdate": {"attribute_name": "公開日", "attribute_value": "2010-02-22"}, "publish_date": "2010-02-22", "publish_status": "0", "recid": "860", "relation": {}, "relation_version_is_last": true, "title": ["Strategic Pricing to Stimulate Node Cooperation in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks"], "weko_shared_id": -1}
Strategic Pricing to Stimulate Node Cooperation in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
https://ir.soken.ac.jp/records/860
https://ir.soken.ac.jp/records/8605c8241ac-b3bd-4ddb-9bda-df1c53cbd6ff
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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Item type | 学位論文 / Thesis or Dissertation(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2010-02-22 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Strategic Pricing to Stimulate Node Cooperation in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
言語 | en | |||||
タイトル | Strategic Pricing to Stimulate Node Cooperation in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_46ec | |||||
資源タイプ | thesis | |||||
著者名 |
李, 明媚
× 李, 明媚 |
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フリガナ |
リ, ミングメイ
× リ, ミングメイ |
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著者 |
LI, Mingmei
× LI, Mingmei |
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学位授与機関 | ||||||
学位授与機関名 | 総合研究大学院大学 | |||||
学位名 | ||||||
学位名 | 博士(情報学) | |||||
学位記番号 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | 総研大甲第1050号 | |||||
研究科 | ||||||
値 | 複合科学研究科 | |||||
専攻 | ||||||
値 | 17 情報学専攻 | |||||
学位授与年月日 | ||||||
学位授与年月日 | 2007-03-23 | |||||
学位授与年度 | ||||||
2006 | ||||||
要旨 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | In wireless ad hoc networks, all nodes cooperate to provide network services. <br />Due to the limited radio transmission range, data packets are usually forwarded <br />through multiple relay nodes before they reach the destinations. If a node always <br />serves as a relay to transmit the packets, it may quickly use up its own energy and <br />other resources. Therefore, some nodes use a selfish approach: they try to avoid <br />forwarding the packets. Such selfish behavior would probably cause the network to <br />break down. Selfish nodes are common within ad hoc networks because they are <br />managed by different authorities. <br /> In this thesis, the node cooperation problems are analyzed in two steps: 1) <br />a game theoretic analysis is provided to stimulate node to cooperate; 2) a price- <br />demand function based incentive model is proposed to optimize the nodes' service <br />demand and service provision, and encourage the relay nodes to be honest. <br /> Firstly, a game theoretic analysis is proposed to study node cooperation. In the <br />related chapter, a "payment and compensation" scheme is used as a less-aggressive <br />way to avoid nodes' non-cooperative behavior. It is assumed that once a packet is <br />sent from a source node, the packet is associated with a sending fee, i.e, when a node <br />needs sending the packets as a source node, a sending fee is required (e.g. reasonably <br />some money). The fee is adjustable according to the network status, whereas the <br />node can also accept or reject the fee. In order to induce voluntary forwarding, the <br />network will also compensate the nodes who consume their energy in forwarding the <br />packets for others. If I think the sending fee as the penalties to the source nodes and <br />the compensation fee as the encouragement to relay nodes, then local optimization <br />of the node, (the desired performance plus the compensat,ion then minus the cost <br />to be paid) will yield an optimal point. Each node can only select its own packet <br />generation strategy, however the final utility of each node is determined by the <br />strategy set constituted by the other nodes. With the game theoretic analysis, I <br />found that by introducing an incentive pricing policy "payment and compensation"<br />the relay nodes have less motivation to drop the packets. However, I also found <br />that game theoretic literature may not be directly applicable in the scenario where <br />cheating nodes exist and how to reasonably charge the source nodes and compensates <br />the relay nodes.<br /> Therefore, secondly, a price-demand function based incentive model (PDM) is <br />proposed. In the PDM model, the network is modeled as a market, where the pricing<br />is determined by the source node's demahd and the relay node's service supply. The<br />source nodes make use of a price-demand function, which allocates payments to <br />the service provider (relay nodes). The relay nodes are encouraged to cooperate <br />in the PDM model, which is based on the assumption that each relay node wishes <br />to maximize its payoff. Then the source nodes can optimize their prices and the <br />number of sending packets to satisfy the relay nodes' payoff requirement. Once <br />the payoff requirements of the relay nodes are satisfied, the relay nodes have no <br />reason to be selfish. In the PDM model, a source node that has packets to send <br />initially broadcasts RREQ in the network. Once the relay node(s) are selected, each <br />relay node replies to the source node for its forwarding cost. Then the source node <br />calculates the price of the sendihg packets it will pay for each relay node and the <br />number of packets it will send. According to the source nodes' demand, it chooses <br />the route with the lowest payment or the route with the la'rgest number of sending <br />packets. The PDM pricing model seeks to address two main issues: 1) to determine <br />how much to charge the source nodes and how much to compensate the relay nodes; <br />2)to avoid the relay nodes to dishonestly report their forwarding costs. Hence, the <br />contributions are summarized as follows: 1) The relay nodes intend to dishonestly <br />report their forwarding cost to gain a high payoff from the source nodes, which <br />obviously contradicts with the motivation to stimulate cooperation. In the PDM <br />model, however, the relay nodes will have no reason to report a false forwarding cost, <br />since only telling the truth guarantees the relay nodes' final payoff. Such a property <br />is shown by the proof. 2) The PDM pricing model reflects the relationship between <br />the service demand of the source nodes and the service supply of the relay nodes. <br />The PDM model can save money for the source nodes for sending the packets, which <br />is indicated by the simulation results. <br /> | |||||
所蔵 | ||||||
値 | 有 | |||||
フォーマット | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | application/pdf |